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Nominal GDP Targeting: A Policy Recommendation to 
Meet the Fed’s Dual Mandate.
A Fed Challenge Response Paper: Fall 2014
By R. Shaw Bridges III
Abstract:
This paper was written in early December 2014 in response to the Federal 
Reserve Challenge Team’s argument for a regime change in the Federal 
Reserve to nominal GDP targeting as the appropriate policy to return 
the U.S. economy to long-term sustainable economic growth. After the 
2007 recession, the FOMC took extraordinary measures to minimize the 
collateral damage caused by bank balance sheets weighed down with 
mortgage-backed securities and other below-investment grade assets. 
The periodic “stress tests” and use of emergency lending facilities were 
historically unprecedented, however, the economy six years later was still 
growing slowly in part due to market uncertainty with FOMC forward 
guidance policy. This paper argues that the Fed is justified in using a policy 
that risks short-term rapid inflation in order to meet the “dual mandate” of 
full employment and price stability, and to prevent cyclical unemployment 
in the economy from deteriorating into structural unemployment.
In 2007, the United States suffered the worst economic downturn 
in recent memory. In response, risk-averse businesses and consumers have 
withdrawn from investment and spending in order to pay off outstanding 
debts. This process of deleveraging, while focused primarily in the 
housing sector, has not only slowed economic growth in the recovery, but 
has also led to persistently low rates of labor force participation as well 
as inflation (Wenli Li and Susheela Patwari 2012, 9, and Fed Challenge 
Manuscript (FCM) 2014). The initial measures the FOMC took to avert an 
economic depression during the recession, which included the opening of 
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emergency lending facilities and the implementation of periodic stress tests 
of bank balance sheets, were extraordinary, and until this disaster struck, 
historically unprecedented (Ben Bernanke 2012, 2). Now approaching six 
years into the official period of recovery with interest rates still at the zero 
lower bound, analysts are divided over their interpretations of relevant 
economic metrics, and whether or not they indicate the much-desired 
self-sustainable economic growth needed to return to stable price levels 
and labor market conditions. This disagreement over interpretations of 
economic metrics in different sectors has only exacerbated uncertainty in 
financial markets, evidence for which has become increasingly apparent 
with threats of bond-market sell-offs in anticipation of Fed Chair Janet 
Yellen’s speeches after the monthly meetings of the FOMC (Gavin Davies 
2014).
In his address to the NABE Policy Conference late in February, 
economist Lawrence Summers stated aptly that today, monetary policy 
experts “wish for the problem of minimizing fluctuations around a 
satisfactory trend” (Lawrence H. Summers 2014, 65). Yet, as economist 
Michael Woodford maintains, if policy-makers fail to act decisively and 
with the utmost transparency, there is a distinctive risk this “wish” for real 
growth and a return to full employment will not be granted anytime soon 
(Michael Woodford interview, 2014). In order to effectively communicate 
monetary policy in the near future, it is this author’s contention that a 
regime change to nominal GDP targeting is needed [See Figure 1]. In this 
paper, I argue this suggested deviation from the current forward guidance 
policy is necessary to meet the dual mandate of full employment and price 
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stability. Not only does this policy allow the Federal Reserve to firmly 
commit to economic recovery in the short term, but it also eliminates 
instability associated with uncertainty over the current ambiguity regarding 
the decision to raise interest rates. While short-term rapid inflation is a risk, 
however, prolonged economic stagnation can lead to a deterioration of 
cyclical into structural unemployment, which produces long run hysteresis 
in the economy. This real risk is sufficient justification for the adoption of 
this bold policy measure.
U.S. Economy After the Recovery
 The Gettysburg College Federal Reserve Challenge Team’s 
argument for nominal GDP targeting is reliant on several historical metrics 
that over the past several years have caused the Federal Reserve to adjust 
downward its estimates of future real growth. According to the Bureau 
of Economic Analysis, the most recent estimate in the third quarter of 
2014 has revised real GDP upward to 3.9% from the previous advance 
estimate of 3.5%. This data point reflects a fall in the percentage change 
from last quarter, due to a downturn in private inventory investment and 
a deceleration in exports, investment spending, personal consumption 
expenditures, which was offset by an 10% increase in federal government 
consumption expenditure and gross investment (Lisa Mataloni, et. al. 
2014). Despite the positive upward revision approaching the 4.6% growth 
in the second quarter, our Fed Challenge team was skeptical that the nearly 
4.0% growth seen in these last two quarters is sustainable. The strong 
growth we have been experiencing over the past two quarters is a transitory 
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phenomenon due to a temporary decrease in oil and gas prices. Although 
consumers will have more to spend in the short-term, there is little reason 
to expect this level of growth to continue indefinitely (Patricia Cohen 
2014). Yet, even if the BEA is now observing evidence of significant real 
growth, the persistent underperformance of the economy in the years since 
2007 has led analysts at the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to revise 
downward estimates of potential GDP [Figure 2] (FCM 2014). According 
to these estimates, Lawrence Summers argues, economists at the CBO 
believe we can return to a steady trend in growth, however, the leisurely 
speed of the recovery has caused them to reevaluate both the size of the 
capital stock and sustainable labor input (Lawrence H. Summers 2014, 
66). These revisions have had the perhaps unintended affect of overstating 
the incremental upward movements in GDP analysts have observed in the 
last two quarters. The period of economic recovery we are experiencing 
has not involved a return of GDP to its potential.
 This need for growth in excess of current trends is further 
exacerbated by estimates of labor force participation and the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics estimates of unemployment. Despite the recent positive 
indication of a drop in unemployment to 5.8%, a breakdown of this metric 
reveals a still volatile labor market [Figure 3] (BLS employment summary 
2014). Both long-term unemployed and civilian labor force participation 
have been mostly constant since April, and still seven million are employed 
part-time out of necessity, possibly due to a skills mismatch [Figure 4] 
(ibid). Furthermore, while employment has shown marginal growth 
in health and food services industries, financial, mining and logging, 
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information, wholesale trade, and government employment numbers have 
largely remained unchanged month to month (ibid.). As our team indicates, 
the revision to 5.8% places us at the high end of the bracketed region of 
unemployment estimates for October between 5.2 and 5.8 as depicted in 
Figure 4. Contrary to the narrative of improvement and progress toward 
full employment, the Fed Challenge team argued that the consistently slow 
restoration of labor force participation indicates just the opposite. They 
cited November estimates of labor force participation at 62.8% of the 
population, which shows little improvement from 63% in September this 
year. Likewise, in their report for the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, 
Stephanie Aaronson and colleagues indicated that the employment to 
population ratio (currently at 59.2%) is still only little over a half percentage 
point higher than the low in the recovery period (Stephanie Aaronson et. 
al., 2014, 2). Labor force participation changes in response to factors such 
as declining market opportunities, wage growth, import competition, and 
retirement, under good economic conditions (ibid., 9, 12). Aaronson and 
colleagues indicates many participants dropping out of the labor force 
temporarily, such as young people enrolling in higher education programs, 
or discouraged workers, may have done so in response to slack in the labor 
market, and will likely return once conditions improve (ibid., 14). Using 
panel data of state level unemployment and LFP, the authors of this study 
found that between .25 and 1% of the decline in labor force participation 
was explained by cyclical effects. Yet, if a return of employment numbers 
an job growth is persistently slow, there is a risk that previously qualified 
workers will lose too much of their human capital. These authors reveal 
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cyclical pressures on employment and highering during the post-recession 
economic recovery, and more importantly, that there are still thousands of 
discouraged workers searching for employment opportunities (ibid., 22-
4).
The Fed challenge team argued against economists who maintain 
that the currently low employment numbers in the U.S. are due primarily 
to pre-recession structural changes. Economists who argue that cyclical 
pressures often mask changes to the long-term composition of the 
unemployment rate have interpreted the Beveridge curve as evidence 
of structural unemployment. Peter Diamond and Aysegul Sahin’s recent 
analysis of the “Beveridge curve” over past recessionary periods in the 
business cycle contradicts this narrative of structural unemployment in the 
labor market (Peter A. Diamond and Aysegul Sahin 2014). They reveal 
instead that the underlying relationship between the job vacancy and 
unemployment rates indicated by the curve reveals historically consistent 
outward movements following recessionary periods. These outward shifts 
suggest that firms are reluctant to resume a steady pace of new employee 
hires out of the labor force following a dip in production (ibid.). Whether 
due to the increased scrupulousness of firms selecting between potential 
employees from an unusually high population of qualified unemployed 
workers, or due to the continuation of the firm and household deleveraging 
process, firms are not hiring at high enough rates to put downward pressure 
on wages. This is evident from wage growth indicators such as average 
nominal hourly earnings, which is currently hovering at around 2.2 percent 
growth this past year [See Figure 5].
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Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen indicates that while nominal 
wages have grown at a 2% rate for several years, in real terms wages 
have been flat (Janet Yellen Aug. 2014, 9). She argues this slow real wage 
growth will not exert “any meaningful upward pressure on inflation,” 
which means nominal wages will not rise for some time after employment 
starts to pick up (ibid). As our Fed Challenge team argued, this lack of 
inflationary pressure on wages will likely persist in foreseeable future, 
especially since oil prices, which recently dropped as low as $65.9 per 
barrel at the end of November, has and will contribute to even lower long-
term inflation [Figure 6]. Lower energy prices, while only temporarily 
putting downward pressure on inflation, have also led to a temporary 
surge in GDP growth that will only last as long as oil prices remain 
depressed (Jonathan Spicer and Rodrigo Campos 2014). In the aftermath 
of the recession, firms were unable to lower wages due to “downward 
nominal wage rigidity,” so layoffs were preferable. Now with economic 
conditions improving, firms have a larger pool of job applicants, including 
but not limited to the previously laid off workers (Janet Yellen 2014, 10). 
Therefore, these metrics collectively indicate a persistently sluggish labor 
market, which is certainly not creating the necessary demand for more 
workers to meet the Federal Reserve’s mandate of full employment (FCM 
2014, 2).
In the years since the Great Recession, much analytical work has 
been done to grasp the economic implications of the process of household 
and firm deleveraging mentioned above. There has been a significant and 
steady downward trend in percentage of debt service payments to disposable 
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income. This downward trend shows that households are, as of early this 
year, continuing the process of deleveraging debts, such as paying down 
old household mortgages. According to Wenli Li and Susheela Patwari, 
the ratio of household credit to disposable income indicates that, as of 
2012, U.S. citizens were only halfway through the process of deleveraging 
(2012, 15). The downward trend in the total credit liability as a ratio of 
disposable income reveals households are continuing to pay down this 
debt-overhang [Figure 7]. Moreover, household savings rates have 
remained high since the recession, hovering at around 3% higher than the 
low in 2007 [Figure 8]. In their book House of Debt (2014), Atif Mian and 
Amir Sufi argue that this process of household deleveraging has led to a 
lack of consumption growth, especially in low-income households that 
responded to the housing price shock by reducing their MPC (Atif Mian 
and Amir Sufi, 2014). Until this debt-overhang is paid down, household 
expenditures as a percentage of disposable income will continue to make 
an insufficient contribution to consumer spending and by extension GDP 
growth. Moreover, as economist Richard Koo has demonstrated, this 
process of deleveraging in the United States indicates we are recovering 
from a “balance-sheet recession,” which can lead to prolonged deficiency 
of aggregate demand (Richard Koo 2011, 1). He argues a policy that sets 
a low target for inflation is futile unless households are beginning to halt 
the deleveraging process. In the recovery from a balance sheet recession, 
aggregate demand is responsive to asset price changes, and not to relative 
changes in consumer prices (ibid). As the Fed Challenge team clarifies, 
however, the housing market as indicated under the Case-Shiller Home 
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Price Index, has recovered slightly this past year [Figure 9]. This is a 
positive indicator that a pick-up in consumer demand is possible, with a 
push from monetary policy-makers. In the next section, I argue the policy 
our team recommended supports this much-needed growth back to pre-
recession trend of GDP.
Moreover, liquidity injections into the banking system have not 
increased the lending and borrowing practices of households and banks 
necessary to offset the fall in consumer spending. Lenders and borrowers 
are still repairing their damaged balance sheets and are hesitant to assume 
more debt-obligations due to perceptions of investment risk (ibid). 
Firms and households have been forced for years to deleverage their 
existing debts, despite interest rates at historic all-time lows. There has 
been some concern that banks are more likely to abuse the risk-taking 
channel and take on excess amounts of low-quality credit due to relaxed 
lending standards associated with future expectations of low interest 
rates (Teodora Paligorova et. al., 2012, 25). Yet the deleveraging process 
left banks that had damaged balance sheets following the recession with 
their hands tied behind their backs, hesitant to lend borrowers. Recently, 
however, the number of banks reporting tightening lending standards has 
dropped significantly, indicating that lenders are beginning to make loans 
to borrowers with potentially poor credit ratings. As the Fed Challenge 
team research into the financial sector indicates, there has been a renewal 
of levered loans despite the opposition of financial regulators, indicative 
of the below investment-grade securities packaged and sold before the 
financial crisis.
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Investors will likely sell these leveraged loans with impunity to 
clients who in search of cheap, high returns, so long as the Federal Reserve 
continues to keep interest rates low [Figure 10] (Peter Eaves 2014). In a 
Financial Times article written this September, Tracy Alloway and Gina 
Chon indicate more that than a third of loans given out by U.S. banks in 
2014 came with leverage exceeding Federal Reserve guidelines, which are 
supposed to limit loans to bearing a value no more than 6x a company’s 
annual earnings (Tracy Alloway and Gina Chon, 2014). Thus, the “frothy” 
growth we have experienced in the financial sector is likely more artificial 
and hence unsustainable outside zero-lower bound conditions. Koo argues 
that the “trauma” firms and households experience after paying down 
the debt-overhang creates an “exit problem” following balance sheet 
recessions. This phenomenon has been observable in Japan since the 
1990s, where the private sector is borrowing averse, interest rates are at 
the zero-lower bound, and government debt as of 2012 was 237 percent 
of GDP (Richard Koo 2011, 34). The concurrent volatility of financial 
markets and household deleveraging in the United States renders higher 
interest rates an impractical Federal Reserve policy in the near future.
Still, expectations of positive economic improvements in the 
United States has led both to appreciation of the dollar, and depreciation 
of foreign currencies [Figure 11]. Recent developments in foreign markets 
suggests that global economic growth may bear down on domestic growth 
as well. The Bank of Japan has recently opted to continue another round 
of LSAPs indicating efforts to depreciate the Yen. Likewise, ECB banks 
of Sweden, Norway, and Switzerland will likely decide to adopt similar 
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unconventional policies such as LSAPs to stem the appreciation of the 
Euro (Nouriel Roubini 2014). New York Fed President William Dudley 
recently commented on Bloomberg that if the dollar appreciates against 
these foreign currencies, the result could mean lower net exports and a 
subsequent “dampening” of inflation (Alister Bull 2014). In developing 
a policy, the Federal Reserve must consider the possibility of external 
threats to self-sustainable growth in the coming years, and weigh the risks 
of high inflation compared with continued disinflation in the economy.
Defense of Nominal GDP Targeting
 This fall, the Gettysburg College Challenge Team offered 
what I have maintained was a convincing analysis of the state of U.S. 
macroeconomic conditions in the wake of the 2007-9 recession. The U.S. 
economy since the Great Recession has been growing at a sluggish pace 
resulting in higher labor market slack than indicated by the current 5.8% 
unemployment statistic. Moreover, recent data indicators, such as dropping 
energy prices and irresponsible financial investment have led to spurious 
signs of growth that is unsustainable outside zero-lower bound conditions. 
In the past two months, the Federal Reserve has ceased its program of 
Large Scale Asset Purchases, leaving forward guidance strategies as our 
primary tool to reduce long-term interest rates (FCM 2014, 3). Different 
types of forward guidance strategies have been tested over the course of 
the recovery, and policy-makers differ in their opinions of its effectiveness. 
From Auguest, 2011 to October, 2012, the Federal Reserve tried calendar 
based forward guidance, promising to keep the federal funds rate near zero 
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until a specified date in the future (ibid.). In December 2012, the Federal 
Reserve altered its criteria to data-based forward guidance, by promising 
to keep rates at the zero-lower bound until the unemployment rate passed 
below the threshold set at 6.5% (ibid., 4). Extensive economic literature 
has been amassed analyzing the benefits and drawbacks of both calendar 
and data based policy recommendations.  There are significant practical 
disadvantages of these previous policies that constrain the economy from 
generating the growth necessary to avoid the threat of secular stagnation. 
I maintain that in order to achieve the growth we require, the Federal 
Reserve must adopt a more integrative approach to forward guidance, 
which targets nominal GDP instead of inflation.
 In the past few years, policy-makers at the Federal Reserve have 
concentrated on chasing the simultaneous goals of stronger growth, capacity 
utilization, and financial stability, yet as the macro-economic analysis above 
reveals, this tripartite objective has become more difficult under zero-
lower bound conditions (Lawrence H. Summers 2014, 66). As economist 
Larry Summers indicates, the economy is today underperforming at the 
potential level forecast in 2007 for the year 2014/15, and the improvements 
described by the unemployment to population ratio are murky [Figures 
1 & 3]. The U.S. economy has made almost no progress returning to 
potential output, but Summers argues that declining real interest rates 
should concern policy-makers more (ibid., 69). He argues economists 
might be observing a period he describes as a “reversal” of Say’s Law, in 
which deficient demand yields deficient supply, and that the continuous 
lowering of interest rates to supply the labor force with jobs could render 
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monetary policy ineffective, and suppress economic growth indefinitely 
(ibid., 71). The result of this secular stagnation could eventually lead to 
a vast number of unemployable workers and a contraction in productive 
capacity, resulting in hysteresis (Matt O’Brien 2014). Moreover, Summers 
indicates the historical record suggests financial instability goes hand-
in-hand with periods of growth. In the recovery period of the business 
cycle especially, with interest rates at the zero lower bound, stability in 
the financial sector becomes harder to achieve in conjunction with strong 
growth. Instead of waiting for the economy to grow naturally, policy-
makers should therefore welcome the inflation necessary to contribute to 
meaningful growth in output.
Summers suggests that the increased MPS of households and 
firms resulting from changes to income distribution, cash hoarding by 
large corporations, and other debt-financed investment demand reducing 
activity may have also lowered the natural equilibrium real rate of interest 
(Lawrence H. Summers 2014, 69). Likewise, Minneapolis Federal Reserve 
President Narayana Kocherlakota argued at the 22nd Annual Hyman P. 
Minsky Conference that in the past six years, the U.S. has experienced 
changes in demand for safe assets that may persist over the coming 
decade (2013, 2). Kocherlakota contends that, given the poor outlook for 
employment and prices, the FOMC should lower the real interest rate even 
further below the 2007 threshold in order to generate significant growth 
(ibid., 6). This growth produced under conditions of low real interest rates 
will likely not come without the cost of financial instability that can occur 
with “inflated asset prices, high asset return volatility and heightened 
76
merger activity” (ibid., 11). The preponderance of conceivable outcomes 
these authors cite suggests the risks associated with generating significant 
growth are difficult to avoid under slow recovery conditions.
The recommendation for nominal GDP target in part derives 
its strength as a policy from the argument that under current economic 
conditions, there is a chance the U.S. could be heading towards secular 
stagnation. Summers and Kocherlakota’s analyses in conjunction with 
the data our Federal Challenge Panel cited in reference to labor market 
conditions and the output gap indicates the risk of prolonged economic 
stagnation could lead to a contraction of human capital resulting in 
hysteresis. In addition to providing a clear policy criterion both for the 
FOMC and financial markets, the nominal GDP target could solve the issue 
Summers and Kocherlakota emphasize regarding the real interest rate and 
inflation. As Harvard Professor Jeffrey Frankel indicates, a nominal GDP 
target guarantees either acceleration in real growth, or that real interest 
rates will decline in response to the policy, which will in turn put upward 
pressure on aggregate demand (Jeffrey Frankel 2012). If indeed the U.S. 
is heading toward similar stagnation to the Japanese economy for the 
past two decades, the window for the Federal Reserve to adopt growth-
supportive policies is narrowing with each passing year.
Unlike price-level targets, which have been judged to be a similar 
objective criterion, a nominal GDP target would provide greater quantitative 
gains. According to Jérémie Cohen-Setton et. al. (2013), five years out of 
the 2007 recession, the price level was not much lower than it would have 
been growing at 2% per year, whereas nominal GDP fell nearly 10%, as 
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indicated in Figure 1. They maintain the rise in expected inflation would 
thus have been smaller under the price-level targeting regime. Critics such 
as Charles Goodhart argue that unlike inflation targeting, however, NGDP 
would function poorly as a kind of Taylor rule, since it would entail both 
an interest rate as well as an output measure, and thus revisions to NGDP 
over time make the risk of overshooting the target at any given interest 
rate more volatile. A proponent of this policy innovation, Scott Sumner 
argues that unlike inflation targets, an NGDP target would only require 
a single estimate of the output gap at the time the target was set, thus 
avoiding the constant revisionary estimates to the output gap associated 
with “flexible inflation targets” (ibid., bibliography). Although there are 
difficulties associated with finding a long-run sustainable trend that would 
support the economic environment for employment and growth, as Scott 
Sumner argues, it would not be unreasonable to look at what past forecasts 
of growth had been prior to the recession as the goal (Scott Sumner 2012, 
10). Suppose that the estimate for the growth rate set to reach a nominal 
GDP target would overshoot the target if growth accelerated or decelerated 
in the near future? The Federal Reserve would only have to make minor 
adjustments to forward guidance policy and other similarly influential 
policies on future expectations, in order to avoid overshooting the target. In 
this way, it would be clear to outside observers what the Federal Reserve’s 
future plans for the economy are under all possible scenarios for growth. 
Thus, this single criterion communicates the Federal Reserve’s intentions 
more efficiently than if continuous revisions were made to policy and 
hence future expectations based on an output gap estimate.
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Furthermore, Charles A.E. Goodhart et. al. (2013) argues that a 
nominal GDP target policy regime would allow inflation to appear even 
more volatile than under price level targeting, because of uncertainty over 
long-run sustainable output. Yet as these recent critics of NGDP targets 
show, once the Federal Reserve sets the forecast for long-run sustainable 
growth at the pre-recession forecast, the Federal Reserve could also deliver 
a 2% inflation target at that long-run rate. In order to mitigate the risk of 
future adjustments to NGDP, Sumner argues, the Federal Reserve could set 
up futures markets and subsidize trading of NGDP futures contracts. This 
would have the effect of anchoring investor expectations and forecast the 
required monetary base to boost nominal growth, by providing the public 
with incentive to return to pre-recession growth trend (Scott Sumner 2011, 
17-18). For some at the Federal Reserve, this policy still presents a risk they 
are unwilling to take due to the uncertainty of previous forecasts, possibly 
due to ex post facto reasons associated with growth estimates prior to the 
recession. Scholars have misconstrued the majority of these components 
of NGDP targets as drawbacks that impede its implementation, and not as 
strengths, or at least net advantages over and above current inflation target 
policy. As it stands, our Team’s current recommendation inadequately 
addresses these concerns and should be changed if more members of the 
Federal Reserve are one day to be swayed to by our assessment.
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Conclusion
The recommendation our panel made to the Federal Reserve 
is necessary to provide the much-needed future growth our economy 
needs to avoid secular stagnation. The current growth trends in the U.S. 
economy are indicative of slow growth from the recession of 2007-9, 
which will lead to persistently low labor force participation. Likewise, 
financial stability can only be achieved in strong growth conditions, 
once the Federal Reserve is able to raise interest rates without disrupting 
the process of deleveraging and subsequent growth in investment and 
consumer expenditure [Figure 12]. The sooner the Federal Reserve can 
return to pre-recession long-run sustainable growth trends the better. By 
setting a nominal GDP target, the Federal Reserve would be making a 
commitment to return the economy back to full employment levels before 
unemployed citizens of the United States become unemployable, and our 
potential output capacity contracts. Raising rates now would be premature, 
and while other policy regimes have had historically limited success, the 
burden of proof falls on our recommendation. As such, any one of the 
advantages to our policy discussed above could be used to persuade a 
battle-tested and wary Federal Reserve.
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Appendix
Figure 1: Nominal GDP & Potential Nominal GDP
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Figure 2: Revisions to GDP
Source: VoxEU.org
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Figure 3: Civilian Unemployment Rate
Source: U.S. Department of Labor: bureau of Labor Statistics
Figure 4: Unemployment Rate and Labor Force Participation Rate
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Figure 5: Wage Growth Average Hourly Earnings
Source: U.S. Department of Labor: Bureau of Labor Statistics
Figure 6: Oil Prices over the past two years
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
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Figure 7: Measure of Household “Debt Overhang”
Source: Board of the Governors of the Federal Reserve, Bureau of 
Economic Analysis 
Figure 8: Personal Savings Rate
Source: US Department of Commerce Bureau of Economic Analysis 
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Figure 9: Case-Shiller Home Price Index
Source: S&P Dow Jones Indices LLC
Figure 10: Bank Lending Standards
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Figure 11: United States Nominal Exchange Rate
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Figure 12: Consumer Expenditure
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce: Bureau of Economic Analysis
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